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ABSTRACT
Presently, most CubeSat components and buses are generally not appropriate for missions where significant or
indeterminate risk of failure is unacceptable. This has precluded their use in many cases where their attributes could
otherwise enable or enhance mission objectives. However, in the future, CubeSats and SmallSats, which deviate from
CubeSat form factors but often incorporate CubeSat components and subsystems, will address challenges that many
presently consider to be beyond the platform’s capabilities. This growing potential utility, combined with the limited
volume of successful CubeSat flight heritage, is driving an interagency effort to improve small satellite mission
confidence.
The Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI)—an activity with broad participation from civil, DoD, and commercial
space systems providers and stakeholders—has been targeting this challenge. This paper will update the community
on how the public-private collaboration is being executed. It will discuss mission confidence approaches considered
and defined to date, why and how they were derived, and next steps the team will implement to broaden SmallSat
mission potential.
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SSRI MOTIVATION
Presently, CubeSat components and buses are generally
not appropriate for missions where significant or
indeterminate risk of failure is unacceptable. This has
precluded their use where their attributes could
otherwise enable or enhance mission objectives or
provide other meaningful benefits (e.g., lower cost,
increased spatial, temporal, and spectral coverage,
agility, resiliency;, etc.). Historically, this has not been
an issue since it was understood and accepted that "high
risk” and “CubeSat” were largely synonymous and
expectations were set accordingly.
The landscape is changing, however. In a NASA
context, numerous CubeSat and SmallSat missions—
small satellites that deviate from CubeSat form factors
but often incorporate CubeSat components and
subsystems—have been defined, are in development, or
are deployed. These include scientific missions requiring
1-3 years of reliable operation in Earth Orbit, missions
to Mars and Venus, asteroids and comets. There are also
astrophysics concepts that seek exoplanets or missing
matter by mapping the distribution of hot gases in the
Milky Way, and CubeSat constellations that operate as a
synthetic radio telescope probing solar energetic particle
acceleration and release to address key Heliophysics
questions. Other governmental agencies have also
formulated concepts that require mission success;
interest in these platforms is not unique to NASA.
These developments are evidence of the growing utility
of these platforms and are driving a public-private effort
to improve CubeSat and more generally, small satellite
mission confidence, while preserving cost efficiencies of
these platforms.
INITIATIVE OBJECTIVES

Best
Practices
and
Design/Development
Guidelines—What design/development guidance
and best practices are consistent with confidence
levels ranging from “do no harm” missions to those
whose failure would result in loss or delay of key
national objectives? How should we “package”
these guidelines so that they have the greatest utility
and impact to the broad SmallSat community?



Lessons Learned—What should we learn from
SmallSat missions that have flown and from
missions in development to inform the success of
future missions?



Knowledge Sharing— The pace of SmallSat
mission capabilities advancement will be informed
by how broadly the community shares knowledge.
What information and resources should the
SmallSat community exchange to increase mission
success and reduce overall development costs?
How do we grow and nurture a community that
exhibits a willingness to share such knowledge more
widely than historically demonstrated? How do we
disseminate it to where it is needed, when it is
needed—to new entrants and established entrants
alike? What is the Government’s role in facilitating
such sharing?



Model-based
Approaches
to
Mission
Confidence—How can we harness and apply the
potential effectiveness and efficiencies associated
with model-based approaches to small satellite
mission confidence? How do we inform the
development of these tools such that their learning
curve and user efficiency do not raise user entry and
utilization barriers.

SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS FINDINGS

The Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI) has been
targeting the SmallSat mission confidence challenge.
SSRI with broad participation from civil, DoD, and
commercial space systems providers and stakeholders
has made significant progress towards defining and
documenting a range of best practices and
design/development guidelines—from those aligned
with “do no harm” missions, to those whose failure
would result in loss or delay of key national objectives.
The effort approaches the challenge from multiple
perspectives—from a high level that considers top-level
mission architecture and objectives, to a lower level that
considers component/ subsystem issues.

The paper Increasing Small Satellite Reliability- A
Public-Private Initiative1 documented community
recommendations from Technical Interchange Meeting1 (TIM-1) convened at the California Institute of
Technology in February, 2017. The first recommendation
was that a confidence-based approach is preferred over a
Class A-D risk-based approach. Instead of characterizing
risk, a SmallSat mission should instead perform some level
of assurance activities to achieve a threshold of confidence
acceptable for their mission.
Secondly, attendees recommended a “menu-style”
approach to inform the assurance activities appropriate for
a given CubeSat/SmallSat mission. This would facilitate a
holistic approach to mission assurance where requirements
are tailored based on trades at the mission or system level.
With this model, a SmallSat mission may decide to
perform high-confidence mission assurance activities in

SSRI considers several approaches to the challenge.
These approaches and questions being addressed are as
follows:
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certain areas and medium- or low-confidence activities in
other areas, based on which components of the SmallSat
are absolutely required to meet mission performance
requirements in space. Effectively, the mission would
select its activities from a menu, and a determination of
confidence-level would be made based on the activities
performed and other contributing factors.
These recommendations have led to a focus on several
approaches to mission confidence—
 Best Practices and Design/Development Guidelines
 Lessons Learned
 Knowledge Sharing
 Model-Based Approaches
A discussion of these approaches follows.
2018 PROGRESS: INTERIM BEST PRACTICES
AND DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES
There have been two SSRI Technical Interchange
Meetings (TIMs) since the first one. TIM-2 was held in
October 2017 to discuss reliability topics (and in some
cases the broader scope of mission assurance) as defined
in a report titled “Mission Assurance Guidelines for AD Mission Risk Classes” under section A5-3 Matrix Reliability.2 The agenda3 for this meeting can be found
and a summary4 of the meeting are publicly available.

What is the mission architecture and how does this
inform practices for missions such as:
– A large Low Earth Orbit (LEO)/Medium Earth
Orbit (MEO) Constellation
– A Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellite
with lifetime of ≤ 5 years in orbit
– A mission beyond GEO
– A LEO mission with 1-2 satellites and lifetime
< 1 year
– A LEO mission with 1-2 satellites and lifetime
> 1 year



What are the key practices that reduce mission risk
and increase mission assurance?



Are there any specific mission or hardware drivers
that weight some practices higher/lower impact?
– What are the key technical challenges and
risks?
– Should higher risk elements receive more
focus?
– How much program risk is acceptable?

This work will help organize and better define “heritage”
processes and practices (i.e. the 35 reliability topics).
The group also collected best practices from the 35
topics plus a small subset of past, present, and future
missions. These both inform, and help expand, the scope
of the best practices to be done.

As a result of these TIMs, a working group (WG) was
formed. This group comprises about 30 members from
across industry, government, and academia. Using the 35
reliability topics defined by the Aerospace Corporation’s
Technical Operating Report (TOR), the WG researched
each topic and documented best practices, references,
and key questions that would help someone identify how
and when a topic should be used in the development and
operations of small satellites.

Summary of Top Confidence Building Activities
During the most recent Technical Interchange Meeting
(TIM-3) following the CubeSat Developers Workshop in
May 2018, the attendees voted on the top activities (from
the 35 topics) that yield greatest increase in confidence.
This was based upon experience/opinion of a variety of
people from industry (7), academia (9), and government
(11). These top activities include engineering the system
for higher confidence, design review and analysis,
radiation testing, and software reliability. The key
practices are further detailed in the next subsections
since they were identified by the larger team as key best
practices. Note that findings are interim; the best
practice effort is ongoing.

This WG also focused on defining a method for
distributing the information to the small satellite
community. The current archiecture focuses on a webbased data set that uses a searchable database of the
information and resources collected so that users can
have more of a “one-stop-shop” for what Reliability
means and how to apply it to small satellites. Further the
web-based architecture will have more of a guided,
interactive tool that could be used to help users through
which reliability topics are the greatest return on time
and cost investment to improve mission assurance. This
tool asks a basic set of questions regarding the mission
of interest and then offers guidance on which specific
practices that inform mission confidence should be used,
or not used. While still a work in progress, key questions
are:
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Engineering the System for Higher Confidence was
voted by the TIM-3 attendees as the topic area they found
most useful for increasing SmallSat reliability. The
topic, as explored by the WG, focused on identifying
perspectives that should be considered within the
SmallSat systems engineering process that can enhance
mission and system resiliency and ensure the entire
system is appropriately defined for the mission. Cost,
schedule, and risk posture of the mission are a few of the
factors identified that can significantly impact the
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systems engineering methods and processes that a
SmallSat employs. Trades must be performed by each
mission to determine the most feasible approach. Some
of the Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC) models
and methods identified by the SSRI WG are listed below.
 Waterfall Model5
 V Model6
 Evolutionary Prototyping Model7
 Spiral Method (SDM)8
 Interative and Incremental Method9
 Agile Development10

level of a program, and describe best practices for
effective reviews. Similar to the systems engineering
section, the SSRI WG found that SmallSat design
reviews may be combined or eliminated depending on
the project budget, schedule, and risk posture. For
example, very small spacecraft (e.g. CubeSats) might not
need a set of separate, formal Subsystem-level reviews.
Especially when a subsystem (e.g. power or the attitude
determination and control system (ADCS)) is being
procured as a commodity item and has already been
delivered and/or flown for other customers. The NASA
Systems Engineering Handbook (NASA SP-2016-6105)
was used as a reference to define the different reviews a
SmallSat mission may consider and when they are
applicable. NASA Systems Engineering Processes and
Requirements (NPR-7123-001B) was also referenced to
show when reviews are typically held throughout the
project life cycle and the product maturity goals for the
different reviews.

Many of the models and methodologies listed above
have been proven on traditional mission architectures
and software engineering. They can be broad and
conservative in nature. They were designed to cover a
wide range of mission applications. For SmallSats it is
extremely important to understand what mission specific
systems engineering activities and methodologies add
the most value given resource constraints. One idea that
has the potential to achieve this is Model Based Systems
Engineering (MBSE) and Model Based Mission
Assurance (MBMA)11. Effective MBSE and MBMA
requires intimate knowledge and understanding of a
particular mission architecture and application. If
modeled with high fidelity MBSE and MBMA can
provide a SmallSat project with a value added
understanding of what systems engineering activities
should be pursued. The challenge associated with MBSE
and MBMA, at the moment, is the tradeoff in overhead
to perform and maintain the modeling versus performing
the traditional systems engineering activities. This is
something that is being explored and must be addressed
in order for MBSE and MBMA to be useful to this class
of missions.

Radiation testing was tied for second place with design
review and analysis for topics that the TIM-3 attendees
found most useful. Radiation testing was likely ranked
high by attendees due to the number of electronic
subsystem designers present. An overview of radiation
sources present in the space environment (e.g. solar
particles), types of radiation effects (e.g. single event
effects (SEE)), and radiation tests with best practices
were provided in this section. In summary, it’s important
for SmallSats to understand the susceptibilities of the
EEE parts they have selected, whether though test,
analysis, or historical knowledge of the part or its
fabrication and design process.
The WG has spent significant time investigating these
topics and has queried numerous sources to derive
interim findings in each area. However, the WG has
recognized that significant work remains to organize the
information that has been collected and tailor best
practices to small satellites.

Small satellite missions often have unique cost- or
capability-driven constraints. These constraints should
inform a mission architecture that mitigate their impacts.
Consider for example, the ground segment and
command/data bandwidth. Cost and capability may
constrain operators’ ability to monitor and control inspace assets. Such an impact can be mitigated by
migrating targeted functions that are typically executed
on the ground—such as fault detection and recovery—to
space. Such approaches to “engineering the system” for
resiliency, are critical to the achieving target levels of
mission confidence. The WG expects many novel
approaches are yet to be conceived.

Software Reliability. In-space software will greatly
inform mission confidence—either through practices
that yield reliable software, or through practices that can
mitigate the impact of system failures and anomalies.
The following recommendations largely address the
former.
The WG identified and addressed many elements that
improve software reliability both from best practices and
established processes. Several specific definitions are
used relative to software. “Reliable software” is robust
and fault tolerant, has very few, if any, bugs and has a
long mean time between errors. When an error occurs, it
is able to handle off-nominal conditions, invalid inputs,
unforeseen events, and varied operational scenarios,

Design review and analysis is another topic that the
TIM-3 attendees found to be useful. Interim guidelines
summarize standard design reviews, illustrate which
reviews are often employed at the mission and subsystem
Johnson
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handling the error and recovering gracefully. Reliable
software is a subset of quality software. “Quality
software” typically considers functionality, usability,
efficiency, maintainability, portability, scalability, and
reliability.





The following discussion summarizes best practices on
how to achieve reliable software, organized into three
major elements:
 Management (organization/staff, managing
Information Technology (IT))
 Process (development methodology, testing)
 Implementation and Coding Techniques (watch
dog timer use, exception handling)





Plan a robust testing program: Set up a testing schedule
and understand what configuration of component units
are needed to perform the tests planned. Coordinate with
management to plan appropriate units of hardware
builds. Test as early as possible. Perform software
assisted component end-to-end testing as soon as
available and aim for end-to-end flat-sat tests as soon as
possible. Plan to use simulators and dummy loads for
testing to increase fidelity of tests. Institute an
independent testing program; the software programmer
should be different than the tester.

Management- Software Reliability
Mentoring: Pair senior experienced programmers to
mentor to junior programmers
Embed software engineers with stakeholders: Embed
software engineers with hardware engineers and
scientists for new research and development. Currently,
many organizations do not do this. For example, NASA
uses software development groups that are often
physically separated from the hardware and instrument
developers. One of the advantages of many small
satellite teams is there is a potential for greater hands-on
feedback between all parties.

Implementation- Software Reliability
Design the system architecture for test and operation:
Start early conversations between hardware and software
engineers. Both sides must understand the
hardware/software interfaces and requirements.
Software requirements drive hardware design and vice
versa. Design the system such that if failure or fault
occurs, the root cause can be derived from the telemetry
and science data. The system should be configurable
such that telemetry can be commanded to vary collection
of type and frequency of telemetry data if necessary.

Process- Software Reliability
The software development process has to match the
underlying project and be cognizant of the stakeholder’s
expectations. It should address issues such as how is the
software going to work with the hardware? What is the
operational scenario? What data are expected to be
produced? Early in a project, structural patterns are more
useful than requirements in developing the basic
architecture for a software system. One key practice is to
conceptualize the software and see how it interacts with
all other elements of the mission. There should be an
understanding of the concept of operations,
characteristics of components, the scheme of the
software, the use cases, operational scenarios, and the
hardware interfaces. Development of a hardwaresoftware interface control document (ICD) can be useful
for early software design. This is a more useful mental
model for early software development than merely
listing the requirements.

Use of timeouts: Liberal use of watch dog time outs will
prevent software from hanging and provide a “safety
valve” for the software to trap and handle errors.
Exception handling: Think through faults and
contingency cases. Have event handlers that detect errors
within software. Create syntax checking code. Have a
process in software that consistently detects, handles,
and responds to anomalous conditions in a safe manner
Use of good programming practices: Minimize scope of
variables, have simple testable modules and minimize
parameters allowed for unit testing, design and write
code to minimize paths such that full path test is that is
not onerous, practice modularity with small subroutines;
break the work down so that they are easily testable,
trackable, understandable, strictly use revision control
system, and strictly employ a bug tracking system.

Understand what are hard versus soft requirements:
Programmers need to have a sense of the types of things
that can change during development and what is
inflexible. Key contributions to requirement definition
include:

Johnson

Conducting trade studies as necessary
Including hardware testability into software
requirements
Partitioning ground software functions and
flight software functions early
Planning
for
software
development
targets/platforms that precede flight hardware
Planning how to upgrade/patch flight software
Making fault tolerance and error handling part
of the software architecture from the beginning
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Software repository: Build a repository of tested code
based on standard hardware for reuse. Given hardware
always changes, build a layer of software that is designed
to be configurable for new hardware e.g., NASA cFE’s
“OS Abstraction Layer”

not satisfy stated mission goals or will simply
acknowledge that the reliability is unknown – this is still
extremely valuable. Identifying and documenting these
risks allows for feedback into the design process. When
using EEE part test data, it is essential to consider the
risk of design changes and lot-to-lot variations in
commercial/automotive grade parts that are not
manufacturer qualified to the target environment(s) (e.g.
radiation, thermal). This risk can perhaps be mitigated
via derating relative to the test results.

Testing: Bake-in the testing into the code; in other words,
when developing new modules, think and write the test
code. Coordinate the test suite – have a program that can
test the software as you run. Automate suite testing and
unit testing to the extent practical. “Unit testing” is
testing individual modules separate from each other. It
requires designing well written modules with carefully
designed and controlled interfaces for minimal external
effect. Poor code might have large unwieldy modules
that cannot easily be tested independently.

Parts Reliability. The level of subsystem design and
manufacturing variability currently in the SmallSat
market provides additional challenges to parts selection
process. To mitigate the reliability uncertainty caused
by the lack of strict design, manufacturing, test, and
analysis requirements it is essential for SmallSat design
teams to communicate with vendors. Such engagement
will help the development team identify the highest risk
sub-systems or weakest link in the typically single string
system. This triage of risk allows the team to focus
additional effort to minimize performance-loss,
efficiency-loss, and any budget on the areas most likely
to fail

There are many facets to software reliability and
programs can utilize some or all of the above practices.
Many of the implementation practices and testing
practices should be prioritized as they are, often, highest
return-on-investment.
LESSONS LEARNED
Small satellite missions rarely fit into traditional
reliability classifications; therefore, design and
reliability practices vary more than those of traditional
space programs. SSRI technical interchange meetings
have included lessons learned presentations by leaders of
SmallSat missions that have addressed a diverse set of
missions, including a 3U CubeSat RF technology
demonstrator, an ESPA class imaging satellite, a
MicroSat LEO Earth science constellation, and Lunar 6U
CubeSat. Lessons learned from these missions provide
important guidance for future SmallSat teams. Many of
the findings from SSRI’s 2018 meetings were originally
identified in SSRI TIM-1 in February 2017, which are
summarized in the bulleted list in the “TIM Findings”
section of Johnson et al., 201712. In this section,
additional lessons learned from the more recent TIMs are
described.

Fault Recovery and On-Orbit Reconfigurability. Design
and planning for fault recovery and on-orbit
reconfigurability was found by several SmallSat
missions to be essential for mission success. Downlink
of housekeeping/state-of-health telemetry and having a
representative flatsat is key to on-orbit failure recovery,
resolution, and mitigation. An ability to accommodate
software updates should inform the designs of the
spacecraft communications subsystem and ground
stations; uplink capability has been a challenge for many
missions.
Management. Establishing a SmallSat team and
managing the design process was found to be an
important element of an efficient yet reliable mission.
SmallSat mission leaders found that small but
experienced teams with reduced administrative burdens
were ideal. The best practices and judgement of an
experienced team can be used to reduce risk when the
level of analysis, test, and review associated with
traditional programs is not possible or practical with
SmallSat budget and schedule constraints.

Subsystem procurement and EEE part selection. For
SmallSat missions, following existing standards is not
typically practical in selection of EEE parts or
subsystems. As a result, a common thread in the lessons
learned shared through the SSRI has been subsystem
procurement and EEE part selection. At the EEE part
level, use of commercial and automotive grade
components is key to keeping costs low. However, each
part should have a reliability “story” that addresses the
risks associated with flying parts that are not space
qualified and screened. This story should provide
answers for thermal, structural, and radiation
performance in the expected environment(s) via testing,
flight heritage, or analysis. In many cases, this story will
Johnson

Design guidelines and best practices applied by
SmallSat teams. The unique constraints of SmallSat
design leads to unique hardware design challenges,
solutions, and failures. This leads us to another common
thread in lessons learned shared through the SSRI:
specific design guidelines and best practices applied by
SmallSat design teams. In this respect, the output is the
following list of somewhat disparate guidelines/best
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practices that were either found valuable to success by a
particular mission, or that would have prevented an onorbit anomaly or failure:


Increase amount of telemetry collected on-board
and avoid use of inferred information. The
expanding use of satellite-to-satellite relay greatly
increases the bandwidth possible.



Avoid scaling “big space” reliability practices to
small satellites but instead scale small satellites to
higher levels of detail to address critical elements
and tall poles.



Vehicles need to have the ability to hard reset the
computer and other elements to properly clear
Single Event Effects (SEEs).
– Ensure this capability is independent of the
flight computer



with the community. SSRI discussions led to a few
knowledge sharing concepts that can broadly benefit
companies. One concept involves the formation of a
consortium where all entities would, under a mutual nondisclosure agreement (MNDA), pool their EEE part
radiation test data. However, it would be very
challenging to ensure that all members contribute their
part to the pool of data. A simpler concept involves an
online board where entities register and share what data
they have or what they are looking for (with whatever
level of detail they are comfortable sharing). This would
allow users to search the postings that align with their
needs and follow up outside of the system to arrange
trades or purchases of test data.
Subsystems
Subsystem level data sharing is currently underway
through the Space Parts on Orbit Now (SPOON)
database developed by the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL); however, access is still limited.
There are efforts underway to make it accessible to a
wider community (see Johnson et al., 201713 for more
details). SPOON currently hosts datasheets and
specifications for SmallSat subsystems. In the future,
subsystem integrators will be able to to report and share
failures or more minor issues in the database. This
feedback will help vendors improve their designs and
assist others with product selection and integration.

Vehicles need to have ability to reprogram/update
software.
– Do not discount the need for uplink bandwidth.
Data volumes can be large when updating flight
software anomalies.

KNOWLEDGE SHARING
Improved avenues for knowledge sharing have the
potential to benefit all members of the SmallSat
community: government, industry, and academia.
Knowledge sharing avenues addressed to date by the
SSRI cover three distinct areas: parts, subsystems, and
missions.

Missions
Statistics on mission success/failure and other details
that have been shown to contribute to mission success
have been analyzed. This work (e.g. Swartwout and
Jayne, 2016)14 is a useful way to identify risk areas, so
that they can be corrected. As the importance and
prevalence of SmallSat grows, these statistics are needed
to inform new reliability processes and standards
targeted at these missions. Improved knowledge sharing
could be accomplished through an online survey, maybe
anonymous to improve response rate.

Parts
Sharing part-level test data has been traditionally
facilitated by government organizations and part
manufacturers. These reports allow for subsystem
developers to minimize risk while designing with
commercial parts when possible and practical given a
radiation environment and risk posture. These EEE part
radiation reports are most readily available on NASA
(JPL and GSFC) and ESA online databases, with
additional test data available through various journals,
conference proceedings (e.g. NSREC), and other places.
Unfortunately, the data are spread in multiple locations
and in different formats. Furthermore these databases
are often years out of date with respect to the test data
that have been collected and analyzed. The NASA Small
Spacecraft System Virtual Institute is currently
developing a federated radiation database portal to allow
access to all of the key databases from one site and
search/browse page.

MODEL BASED APPROACHES
Many of the electronic components developed for
traditional large spacecraft do not meet the size and
power requirements of SmallSats. By necessity,
developers are almost exclusively using electronics
produced for the consumer market that are not designed
to meet a harsh radiation environment or operate in the
temperature range of space. Consequently, no radiation
test data exists for these components nor does the
manufacturer guarantee the reliability of parts operated
outside of the normal operating temperature range. This
lack of information is of concern for low earth missions
despite the fact that the most harmful and penetrating
radiation events are shielded by the earth’s magnetic

When companies invest in part-levels radiation testing,
the cost and competitive advantage provided by the
testing and analysis usually precludes them from sharing
Johnson
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field. However, the environmental hazards are greatly
increased in deep space where maintaining normal
thermal ranges is more difficult and the ionizing
radiation fluxes are higher and more damaging.

models, and process design kits; all of which are readily
accessible.
Predictive Models
The second branch of the model-based approach is
intended to be predictive.

The SSRI is evaluating alternatives to the traditional
approach to screen and test commercial electronics for
two reasons. First and foremost, cost and schedule are
typically too constrained to permit a complete radiation
and reliability test program for all electronic parts used
on a SmallSat. Such test programs can cost millions and
easily add years to the schedule. Secondly, the information needed during the design cycle changes.

Of all the environmental effects on microelectronics in
space, radiation effects dominate the failure rates. It is
safe to say that all digital and mixed signal electronics
will experience some level of radiation induced errors
and all power electronics will experience a total dose
induced performance degradation. The point is that the
vast majority of commercial electronics will see either a
performance degradation or a non-recoverable failure in
the deep space radiation environment.

Moreover, the designer has to have some reasonable
confidence the components can survive the mission
environment prior to completing the design or risk many
redesign cycles as parts fail the environmental tests. This
conundrum can be solved through a comprehensive
modeling approach that provides some rudimentary
insight into the failure modes and component reliability
at the onset of a design and matures to predictive part and
circuit modeling later in the design cycle.

Still, the space industry has learned to mitigate these
radiation effects to a degree at the circuit level (i.e.
watchdog timers), the board level (i.e. redundancy) or
the system level (i.e. power down during the transit
through the South Atlantic Anomaly) as long as the
severity and frequency these radiation effects are limited.
Therefore, it is imperative to accurately model the
radiation effects at the part level, and simulate the impact
on the circuit/board as well as the effectiveness of
potential mitigation schemes relatively early in the
design cycle. One of the challenges is that this requires
modeling and simulation approaches that can propagate
radiation effects across multiple levels of abstraction
from the transistor to the system level.

Inductive Models
The SSRI has identified a number of reliability modeling
tools capable of modeling a complex system such a
whole spacecraft. The benefit of this class of tools is that
the designer can understand risk drivers at the SmallSat
level even when the design is at the block diagram level
or evaluate the efficacy of design choices such as
redundancy. To achieve this level of insight, one might
be already well served by using generic reliability
information from, for example, multi-junction solar
panels flown in the past. While this approach may not
capture the true performance of the actual panels, it will
be sufficient to evaluate the spacecraft’s power
distribution system over its lifetime.

The SSRI is evaluating a number of radiation-aware
modeling tools for the ability to predict radiation effects
in various commercial electronic components. The
IMPACT tool16 is an Arizona State University tool to
model the total dose effects on bipolar junction transistor
(BJT) structures as a function of accumulated dose and
dose rate. Initial comparisons with experimental data
have demonstrated a good agreement between the code
and bipolar components such as regulators, voltage
regulators and temperature sensors from various
manufacturers.

The typical structure of such tools is comprised of a
functional layer that describes the logical operation of
the system and a physical layer that traces faults through
a fault tree. In many instances, a statistical layer can be
added, where system level failure probabilities and their
uncertainties can be computed through a Monte Carlo
simulation or through Bayesian Belief Networks. The
SSRI is currently evaluating a tool by UCLA15 to model
a notional 6U deep space SmallSat for reliability and
radiation effects and build reusable libraries of
subsystems that can be adapted by actual SmallSat
missions.

The next step up in the simulation hierarchy is the
Vanderbilt University effort to use the commercial
Questa tool by Mentor Graphics17 to simulate the impact
of transistor-level parameter changes arising from total
dose irradiation on the system-level behavior of a
command and data-handling (C&DH) board for a
notional deep space CubeSat. The C&DH board has
various analog, digital, mixed-signal, and thermal
components that require a diverse set of simulation
approaches. Mentor Questa is demonstrated to be a cosimulation platform that can accept models written in
SPICE, VHDL, Verilog, and SystemC and simulate
them all together with coordinated time stepping. The

The goal is to construct these model libraries to leverage
information provided by lower level predictive models
(see also next section), or by manufacturers of
commercial electronics. Such information sources
include data and specification sheets, part macroJohnson
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team constructed radiation models of various
components on the C&DH board with parameters that
had probability distributions derived from continuous
Bayesian regression, Compact model results from the
IMPACT tool and radiation test data. Subsequently, a
Monte Carlo simulation randomly sampled the
parameter distributions in both the radiation and the
electrical models. The overall technique was
demonstrated on a temperature control loop for the
C&DH board. The simulation method predicts an
increase of 10 to 15 Kelvin in steady-state temperature,
depending on the radiation dose. The same modeling
method can be used to predict the impact of radiation on
other board-level performance metrics.

attributes could enable or enhance objectives or provide
other meaningful benefits. The working group will
continue to refine a best practices approach to mission
confidence. SSRI will also continue to refine a
knowledge repository and make it broadly accessible to
raise the community’s design and development
competencies, while continuing to evaluate alternatives
to the traditional approach to screen and test commercial
electronics. Industry and academia engagement in the
effort, contributing their experience, perspectives, and
capabilities, will significantly inform its success.
It is vital that metrics are collected to understand how
this capability is evolving. CubeSat and SmallSat
developers are encouraged to report findings on the
CubeSat18 and SPOON19 datatbases.

THE FUTURE
SSRI is a dynamic initiative, with a goal of improving
SmallSat mission confidence in order to facilitate
broader use of these platforms for missions where their

The next TIM will be held in November 2018; these and
these and other topics will be discussed and refined at
that time.

8
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